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1 INTRODUCTION
We consider the (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) (hereafter
referred to as the CS model) to study the eﬀect of mediation in comparison to unmediated cheap-
talk communication. In this game, the strategic interaction and information-transmission between an
uninformed decision maker (called the receiver) and an informed agent (called the sender) has been
studied, and what can be achieved by unmediated cheap-talk communication is well established. CS
have proved that any (Bayesian-Nash) equilibrium in this cheap-talk game is equivalent to a partition
equilibrium where the informed agent reveals one of the finitely many elements of the partition in
which the true state of nature lies. The number of elements,  , in the most informative partition
equilibrium in the CS model depends on the value of the preference divergence parameter, .
Krishna and Morgan (2004) introduced a new unmediated communication protocol which improved
the welfare of the two players relative to the CS equilibrium. Krishna and Morgan also constructed
an example of mediated communication in the CS model demonstrating the possibility of Pareto
improvement.
Blume, Board and Kawamura (2007) consider the eﬀect of adding noise to the sender’s message in
the Crawford-Sobel model. The noise can be interpreted as communication error. Also, one can think
of their communication scheme as a special kind of a mediator who passes on messages from the sender
to the receiver with some exogenous noise added on. Specifically, with some probability, the mediator
passes on the sender’s message to the receiver unchanged; otherwise, independent of the message sent
by the sender, the mediator passes on a random message from some fixed error distribution. They
show that for a suﬃciently small amount of noise, it is possible to improve upon the  -partition CS
equilibrium as long as  6= 122 for any integer  and   12 .
Goltsman, Horner, Pavlov and Squintani (2009) subsequently analysed the general form of media-
tion in the cheap-talk framework of CS. They derive the optimal unconstrained mediated mechanism
and an upper bound on the receiver’s payoﬀ that can be achieved by any mediated equilibrium. This
upper bound is achieved by the construction of Blume et al (2007) when the level of noise is chosen
appropriately.1 This bound is also the same as the value of the expected payoﬀ to the receiver that is
achieved by the equilibrium of the modified CS game constructed by Krishna and Morgan when   18 .
Here, we should point out that in all the above three models, welfare-improving mediation or noise
involves larger number of messages compared to the minimal number of messages required in the
most informative CS equilibrium. None of the papers mentioned above addresses this issue of whether
1Blume (2011) subsequently showed that this upper bound can also be implemented without any communication via
a device or without any strategic mediator. Instead, it can be achieved by a strategy-correlated equilibrium of the game
in which initially both players privately receive a signal from a correlation device and then the CS game is played.
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welfare-improving (non-strategic) mediation must necessarily involve additional messages and more
actions induced in equilibrium.
We, in this paper, consider mediation schemes2 in which the informed agent reports one possible
element of a partition to a mediator (a communication device) and then the mediator suggests an action
to the uninformed decision-maker according to the probability distribution of the device. We ask the
question whether it is suﬃcient to use simple schemes (involving the same number of messages,  , as
in the most informative CS equilibrium) for mediation to be Pareto superior to the CS equilibrium.
In particular, we concentrate on a specific form of mediated equilibria, that we call -simple
mediated equilibria, in which the mediator is restricted to use the same number () of inputs and
outputs as the number of elements of the  -partition CS equilibrium. This clearly imposes a restriction
on the mediated mechanisms that one may consider, however this restriction is made in order to enable
us to answer the above question. The mediator, associated with a specific probability distribution, can
be interpreted as a communication scheme that the players mutually agree to use. In this scheme, the
possible number of elements the sender is allowed to use and the receiver is expected to receive via the
mediator is restricted to  , as in the most informative CS equilibrium. Note that , and hence  , is
commonly known to the players.
The main result of our paper (Theorem 1) is that the  -partition CS equilibrium cannot be
improved upon by the corresponding  -simple mediated equilibrium when the preference divergence
parameter  is small (less than 122 ). In other words, when  is small, mediation needs to use more
messages (relative to the minimal number of messages that can be used in the best CS equilibrium) in
order to improve upon the  -partition CS equilibrium. If mediation or noise is simply a randomisation
over the messages that the sender would have reported in an original unmediated CS equilibrium, then
it cannot improve information transmission, when the degree of preference misalignment is small.
Although Goltsman et al (2009) provided a necessary and suﬃcient condition for an incentive
compatible mediation rule to be optimal and showed that two specific mediation rules proposed in
the literature (that of Blume et al (2007) and by Krishna and Morgan (2004)) are indeed optimal for
certain values of , we do not know what the structure of other optimal mediation rules might be.
One might ask if there exists an optimal mediation rule which is also an  -simple mediated equi-
librium. If the answer is yes, this could imply that a suitable randomisation over the messages used
in the original unmediated CS equilibrium could improve information transmission and there would
2 Ivanov (2010) considers the role of a strategic mediator in the CS framework. He shows that, for any bias ,
there exists a strategic mediator who can help achieve the optimal payoﬀs obtained through a non-strategic mediator.
Dessein (2002) considered delegation to an intermediary in the CS framework. However, the role of his “intermediary”
is diﬀerent from that of “mediation” in our context. Kovac and Mylovanov (2009) studied the relative performance of
noisy or stochastic mechanisms and deterministic mechanisms in a very similar principal-agent setting.
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be no need to use additional messages. However, we cannot deduce the minimal number of messages
required in all such optimal mediation rules from Goltsman et al (2009).
Theorem 1, in this paper, thus advances our understanding of the eﬀect of mediation in the CS
model. It partially answers the question of whether the minimal size of the message space needs to be
larger for mediation to Pareto dominate the CS equilibrium. Although we do not answer the question
of whether or not an  -simple mediated equilibrium can always improve on the CS equilibrium for
large , we provide a suggestive example.
2 THE MODEL
2.1 Crawford-Sobel Game
Our set-up is identical to the uniform-quadratic utility CS Model, as presented in the literature.
Informed readers may wish to skip this subsection.
There are 2 agents. The informed agent, called the sender (), precisely knows the state of the
world, , where  ∼  [0 1], and can send a message at no cost, based on his private information,
to the other agent, called the receiver (). The receiver, however doesn’t know  but must choose
some decision , based on the information contained in the signal. The receiver’s payoﬀ is ( ) =
−( − )2, and the sender’s payoﬀ is (  ) = −( − ( + ))2, where   0 is a parameter that
measures the ‘bias’ in their preferences.
CS have shown that any equilibrium of this game is essentially equivalent to a partition equilibrium
where only a finite number of actions are chosen in equilibrium and each action corresponds to an
element of the partition. For   12(−1) , where  ≥ 2 is an integer, there is a partition equilibrium3
in which the state space is partitioned into  elements, characterised by 0 = 0  1  2   
−1   = 1, where  =  + 2( − ); in this equilibrium,  sends a message for each
element [−1 ), and given this message,  takes the optimal action  = −1+2 . We call this
the  -partition CS equilibrium. For 12(+1) ≤   12(−1) , the “best” equilibrium (the one that
maximises the receiver’s expected payoﬀ, ) is the  -partition CS equilibrium4. For such an
equilibrium, the receiver’s expected payoﬀ is  = − 1122 − 
2(2−1)
3 , while the sender’s expected
payoﬀ is  =  − 2.
3For 1
4
≤ , babbling is the only equilibrium.
4Note that for any   1
2(+1) , an -partition CS equilibrium does exist. However, it is not the “best”. Chen,
Kartik and Sobel (2008) provide a formal selection argument for the “best” equilibrium.
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2.2 Mediated Equilibrium
Within the CS framework, we now consider mediation, a possible structure of which could be as follows:
 sends a message based on his private information to the mediator; the mediator then chooses an
action according to a commonly-known probability distribution and recommends it to . We here
consider a specific form of direct mediation (in the spirit of canonical mechanisms, as initiated and
analysed extensively by Forges (1986) and Myerson (1982, 1986)) and formally define such a mediated
talk below.
Definition 1 An  × mediated talk is [{}=0  {}=1  {}=1;=1 ] where 0 = 0 
1  2    −1   = 1, each  ∈ [0 1] for  ∈ {1 2 }, each  ∈ [0 1] for
 ∈ {1 2 },  ∈ {1 2 } with
X
=1
 = 1.
In an  × mediated talk,  reports one of the  possible elements, [−1 ), in which the true
state  may lie, to the mediator and given the report  ∈ [−1 ), the mediator then recommends
to  one action,  , out of the  possible actions with probability  .
Our mechanism5 (an  × mediated talk) is said to be in equilibrium if it is incentive compatible
for both players, that is, if (i)  has the incentive to be truthful to the mediator given the probabilities
, and (ii)  has the incentive to obey the mediator’s recommendation  , given the posterior
probabilities on the state of nature.
In what follows, we will focus only on  ×  direct6 mediated equilibria. We will call such an
equilibrium an  -simple mediated equilibrium.
Let () denote the diﬀerence in expected utility from inducing the distributions {+1}=1 and
{}=1 that a type  sender would obtain. Formally, () =
X
=1
( − +1) [ − ( + )]2.
Definition 2 For any specific value of , an  × (or, -simple) mediated equilibrium is an  ×
(with  = ) mediated talk that satisfies
(i) incentive compatibility for : for all  ∈ {1 2   − 1}, () = 0 and  0()  0.
(ii) incentive compatibility for :  = argmax −
X
=1
 1(−−1)
R 
−1( − )2 for all  ∈
5This is the type of mechanism Krishna and Morgan (2004) also considered to construct an example in their paper.
Myerson (website) used a “discrete” version of such a mechanism.
6We are using a suitable version of the revelation principle (Myerson 1982) here to characterise the set of -simple
mediated equilibria involving direct messages only, to cover all simple mediation schemes which can use any  inputs
and any  outputs. As it turns out, considering only such direct mechanisms is not restrictive, as a revelation principle
type result does hold in this context and can be proved using the methods constructed by Ray (2001).
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{1 2  }, where , the posterior probability that  ∈ [−1 ), is given by  = (−−1)X
=1
(−−1)
.
In (), () = 0 essentially corresponds to the “arbitrage condition” in the CS equilibrium.
Incentive compatibility for the sender requires that the  type sender is indiﬀerent between inducing
{+1}=1 and {}=1. Also, a sender with type  ∈ ( +1) should prefer the distribution
{+1}=1 over {}=1, implying that  0()  0. Note that  0()  0 at  =  and since  0() is
constant, it has to be positive everywhere.
In (), incentive compatibility for  requires that when  has been recommended,  indeed
chooses the action  because it maximises his expected utility given his posterior beliefs.
2.3 Characterisation
An  -simple mediated equilibrium can be characterised easily. Incentive compatibility for , as in
Definition 2(), requires for all  = 1  ,
X
=1
 £( − −1)2 − ( − )2¤ = 0.
This implies
 = 12
⎡
⎢⎣
(1−
X
 6=
)(2−2−1)+
X
 6=
(2−2−1)
(1−
X
 6=
)(−−1)+
X
 6=
(−−1)
⎤
⎥⎦. (1)
Incentive compatibility for , as in Definition 2(), requires
−1X
=1
(+1 − ) ( −  )  0 and
X
=1
( − +1) [ − ( + )]2 = 0, for all  = 1   − 1.
The latter implies, for all  = 1   − 1,
2 ( + ) =
−1X
=1
(−+1)(2−2)
−1X
=1
(−+1)(− )
, i.e.,
2 ( + ) =
(1−
X
 6=
−+1)(2−2)+(+1−1+
X
 6=+1
+1)(2+1−2)+
X
 6=+1
(−+1)(2−2)
(1−
X
 6=
−+1)(−)+(+1−1+
X
 6=+1
+1)(+1− )+
X
 6=+1
(−+1)(−)
. (2)
Thus, an -simple mediated equilibrium is characterised by [{}=0  {}=1  {}=1 ;=1 ]
satisfying equations (1) and (2) with the constraints that
−1X
=1
(+1 − ) ( −  )  0, for all
 = 1   − 1.
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3 RESULTS
To state and prove our results, we take   12(−1) , for which the  -partition CS equilibrium exists.
We first observe that the  -partition CS equilibrium is actually equivalent to a particular  -simple
mediated equilibrium, namely, one with  =  =  +2(−), for all  ∈ {1 };  = −1+2 ,
for all  ∈ {1  } and  = 0, for all ,  ∈ {1  },  6= .
Note that, in the class of simple mediated equilibria,  =  − 2, that is, ex-ante, the
sender’s and receiver’s welfare ranking agree. For any simple mediated equilibrium, it is also clear that
 = −
X
=1
[(1−X
 6=
) R −1( − )2 + X
=1
 6=
 R −1( − )2], which implies
 = −13
X
=1
[(1−P 6= ){( − −1)3 − ( − )3}+ X
=1
 6=
{( − −1)3 − ( − )3}].
We are interested in the question when can the  -partition CS equilibrium not be improved upon
by an  -simple mediated equilibrium, that is, when is the  -partition CS equilibrium indeed the best
among the set of  -simple mediated equilibria. Our main result answers the above question by solving
the following constrained maximisation problem that we call the final problem.
Final problem: Maximise  among the set of  -simple mediated equilibria (as characterised in
the previous section).
Before we state and prove our main result, as a first step, we consider the following constrained
maximisation problem that we call the initial problem:
Initial problem: Maximise
{}−1=1 {} 6=
 subject to equations (1) and (2).
The diﬀerence between the final problem and the initial problem is simply the set of restrictions
that
−1X
=1
(+1 − ) ( −  )  0, for all  = 1   − 1.
Our first lemma below proves that for   122 , the initial problem has a “corner” solution.
Lemma 1 For   122 , a solution of the initial problem is achieved at  = 0, for all  6= ; ,
 ∈ {1 }.
Lemma 1 also characterises the values of {}−1=1 at this solution of the initial problem. They are
indeed the CS values given by  =  =  + 2( − ), for all  ∈ {1   − 1}. The formal
proof of Lemma 1 has been relegated to the Appendix.
The following result shows that the  -partition CS equilibrium indeed provides a (local) maximiser
of  among the set of  -simple mediated equilibria. The result is an immediate consequence of
Lemma 1 and thus the formal proof is postponed to the Appendix.
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Corollary 1 For   122 , a local maximum of the final problem is achieved at  = 0, for all  6= ;
,  ∈ {1 } and  =  =  + 2( −), for all  ∈ {1   − 1}.
We are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem 1 For   122 , no -simple mediated equilibrium can improve upon the -partition CS
equilibrium.
Our theorem above proves that for   122 , the  -partition CS equilibrium is actually a global
maximum among the set of  -simple mediated equilibria.
We first note that the global maximum exists, by appealing to the Weierstrass Theorem, since the
objective function is continuous and is defined over a compact set.
To prove the theorem, we first reconsider  of any  -simple mediated talk and write the
following expression:
−3 =
X
=1
[(1−X
 6=
){( − −1)3 − ( − )3}+
X
=1
 6=
{( − −1)3 − ( − )3}].
We work with the above expression, involving the variables, [{}=0  {}=1  {}=1 ;=1 ],
satisfying equation (1) from the previous section, namely,  = 12
⎡
⎢⎣
(1−
X
 6=
)(2−2−1)+
X
 6=
(2−2−1)
(1−
X
 6=
)(−−1)+
X
 6=
(−−1)
⎤
⎥⎦.
We redefine the above expression as a function,  , explicitly as a function of the variables {}−1=1
and {} 6= such that the domain satisfies equation (1). Let us thus write
 (1  −1; 12 13  1 ; 21 23 2 ; ; 1  −1)
=
X
=1
[(1−X
 6=
){( − −1)3 − ( − )3}+
X
=1
 6=
{( − −1)3 − ( − )3}].
We first observe the following result which characterises a property of the function,  .
Lemma 2 For any (1  −1),   0, at  = 0, for all  6= ; ,  ∈ {1  }.
Abusing notation, we treat  as a function of {} 6=, for any fixed level of (1  −1), and
also, as a function of {}−1=1 , for fixed values of  , for all  6= . We then consider the minimisation
of  with respect to  , for all  6= , and prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3 For any (1  −1),  , as a function of {} 6=, attains a (global) minimum at  = 0,
for all  6= ; ,  ∈ {1 }.
The next lemma indicates an important property of  , as a function of (1  −1), for a particular
value of {} 6=.
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Lemma 4 At  = 0, for all  6= ,  , as a function of {}−1=1 , is strictly convex.
The proof of Theorem 1 is now a direct consequence of the above lemmata. We provide the formal
argument in the Appendix.
Theorem 1 proves that for   122 , a global maximum among the set of  -simple mediated
equilibria must coincide with the  -partition CS equilibrium. Also, Lemma 3 suggests that, for
  122 , a global minimum of  is attained at  = 0, for all  6= ; however, it need not be at the
values of {}−1=1 given by the  -partition CS equilibrium.
4 REMARKS
4.1 Illustration
Our result can be illustrated easily using a simple example with  = 2. Recall that a 2-partition
CS equilibrium exists for   14 and for 112 ≤   14 , the best CS partition equilibrium involves two
elements. Theorem 1 confirms that the 2-partition CS equilibrium can not be improved upon by
any 2-simple mediated equilibrium when   18 . Our result also suggests that a 2-simple mediated
equilibrium may improve upon the 2-partition CS equilibrium when  is large enough, that is, for
1
8 ≤   14 . We illustrate this comment for  = 16 . Here, the 2-partition CS equilibrium is characterised
by  = 16 , 1 = 112 , and 2 = 712 with utilities  = − 7144 ' −00486 and  = − 11144 ' −00764.
From the characterisation presented in Section 23, a 2-simple mediated equilibrium is given by7
( 1 2 11 12 21 22), where, , 1, 2 ∈ (0 1), 11 12 21 22 ∈ [0 1] and 11 + 12 = 1, 21 +
22 = 1. The incentive compatibility constraints for  and for  can all be combined into one equation
given by
(1−12)2+21(1−2)
4[(1−12)+21(1−)] +
122+(1−21)(1−2)
4[12+(1−21)(1−)] −  = .
Thus, a 2-simple mediated equilibrium in this set-up can be characterised by three variables
(12 21 ), where,  ∈ (0 1) and 12 21 ∈ [0 1], satisfying the above equation.
It is now easy to check that for  = 16 ,  = 02245201023, 1 = 01745967377, 2 = 06077768002,
12 = 003, and 21 = 004 constitute a 2-simple mediated equilibrium with utilities  ' −00483
and  ' −00760 and can improve upon the corresponding 2-partition CS equilibrium.
The interpretation of the above example is as follows. One can see that the partitioning point  and
the two decisions 1and 2 of the 2-simple mediated equilibrium are all larger than the corresponding
values of the 2-partition CS equilibrium. The fact that the lower interval is bigger and the higher
7We drop the subscript in 1 for presentational simplicity.
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element of the partition is smaller in size means that more information is being transmitted. This is
possible because the mediator is allowed to randomize between 1and 2.
4.2 Goltsman et al (2009)
One might be interested in knowing how our theorem compares with the corresponding results in
Goltsman et al (2009) and in particular, if there is a connection between our Theorem 1 and Theorem
2 of Goltsman et al (2009). In Theorem 2 of Goltsman et al, an optimal mediation rule is provided. One
interesting corollary of this theorem is that for  = 122 , this particular optimal mediation rule cannot
improve upon the  -partition CS equilibrium. This implies that the  -partition CS equilibrium is
optimal, irrespective of the number of messages that the players are allowed to use, when  = 122 .
However, since Theorem 2 of Goltsman et al is about a specific optimal mediation rule which uses
more messages than our  -simple mediated equilibrium and in general, there might be a continuum of
optimal mediation rules. We thus feel that this theorem is not useful in answering the question posed
in our paper.
A more meaningful approach8 might be to ask if the technique used by Goltsman et al to prove
their Theorem 2 can provide any insight or an alternative way of proving our result. Goltsman et al
introduced a lemma (Lemma 2 in their paper) to derive a necessary and suﬃcient condition for an
incentive compatible mediation rule to be optimal and to provide an upper bound on the objective
function using an incentive compatible mediation rule. One might try to identify such a condition and
an upper bound in the more constrained setting of  -simple mediation rules. If the characterisation
of optimal mediation rules in Lemma 2 of Goltsman et al could be appropriately modified to derive a
characterisation of optimal  -simple mediated equilibria, then this would provide another method of
proof of our Theorem 1. We would like to point out that we do not derive such a characterisation in
this paper and that such an alternative proof is not straightforward either.
It is also worth mentioning two recent papers on the connection between communication equi-
librium and correlated equilibrium (Blume (2011), Forges and Vida (2012)) that are relevant to our
work. Forges and Vida (2012) proved that (essentially) every communication equilibrium of any finite
Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of a
game, extended by a cheap-talk phase before the original Bayesian game. On the other hand, specific
to the CS model, Blume (2011) constructed a strategy-correlated equilibrium, that sends messages to
both players before the sender sends any message to the receiver, to achieve the best possible payoﬀ
from the mediated equilibrium of the CS model. Importantly, in his construction, unlike our work,
neither player needs to send messages to the device. Following these new results, one may be interested
8We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this approach.
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to know whether our  -simple mediated equilibrium can be obtained as a correlated equilibrium in
the sense of Forges and Vida (2012), or as a strategy-correlated equilibria, as in Blume (2011). In par-
ticular, one may further ask whether or not these new constructible correlated or strategy-correlated
equilibria will involve only a few ( many) messages. Clearly, these are important questions for future
research.
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5 APPENDIX
We collect the proofs of all our results in this section.
Proof of Lemma 1. It suﬃces to show that, for   122 , the  -simple mediated equilibrium
corresponding to  = 0, for all  6= ; ,  ∈ {1  } solves the initial problem.
Let us first consider the Lagrangian:
L = −
X
=1
[(1−X
 6=
){( − −1)3 − ( − )3}+
X
=1
{( − −1)3 − ( − )3}]
−
−1X
=1
[
(1−
X
 6=
−+1)(2−2 )+(+1−1+
X
 6=+1
+1)(2+1−2)+
X
 6=+1
(−+1)(2−2 )
(1−
X
 6=
−+1)(−)+(+1−1+
X
 6=+1
+1)(+1− )+
X
 6=+1
(−+1)(−)
]
+2
−1X
=1
 + 2
−1X
=1
.
To prove the result, we just need to show that at the proposed solution, there exist {}−1=1 such
that L = 0, for all  = 1   − 1 and L  0, for all  6= , when   122 .
First, at  = 0, for all  6= ; ,  ∈ {1 }, it is easy to check that  = −1 = 12 , and
 = 0, for all  6= ,  − 1. Also,  = (−−1)(+−1−−−1)2(−−1) , for all  6=  and  = 0, for
all  6= , for all .
Subsequently, it can be shown that L = −3[( − )2 − (+1 − )2] +  − +12 − −12 , for
all  = 1  − 1 (since 0 and  are not defined, define them to be equal to zero).
Now, L = 0 implies 12(+1 − ) + 2 − +1 − −1 = 0, for all  = 1   − 1.
This gives us a system of ( − 1) equations in ( − 1) variables, 1 −1, which can be
succinctly written in matrix form as
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
2 −1 0 0   0
−1 2 −1 0   
0 −1 2 −1 0  
0 0 −1    0
      0
   0 −1 2 −1
0   0 0 −1 2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(−1)×(−1)
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1
2
3



−1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(−1)×1
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
12(1 − 2)
12(2 − 3)
12(3 − 4)



12(−1 −  )
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(−1)×1
The ( − 1)× ( − 1) matrix above is symmetric and tridiagonal, the -th element of the inverse of
which is given by 14 (+ − |  −  |)(2− |  −  | −− ) (using results by Hu and O’Connell (1996)
and Yamani and Abdelmonem (1997)).
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Thus, solving the equations, we get,  = −2(−) [3 − 22 + 4 ] (which is  0, for all
 = 1   − 1).
We are now ready to show that, when   122 , L  0, for all  6= , at the proposed solution
(the CS equilibrium values of ’s and ’s) and with the above values , for all  = 1   − 1.
For all  6= , we have,
L
 = [( − −1)3 − ( − )3]− [( − −1)3 − ( − )3]
−[ (−)(−+1)(−+1) ]− −1[ (−)(−−1)(−1−) ]− ( + −1)[  ].
We first prove that L  0, for  = 1, when   122 . Here,
L
1 =
(1−)2(22+1)(22−2−1)(1224−1223−1223−422+8222−122+6+6+3)
3(22+2−4−1)(22−4−1) .
Clearly, (i) (1−)2  0; (ii) (22+1)  0; and (iii)3  0. Also note that as   12(−1) , we have
22−2 −1  0. It is now easy to check that (iv) 22−2−1  0; (v) 22+2−4−1  0;
and (vi) 22 − 4 − 1  0.
Finally, the factor,
(vii) 1224 − 1223 − 1223 − 422 + 8222 − 122 + 6 + 6 + 3
= 3(22− 1)2 + 6(1 + )(2+ 1− 22) + 422[( − 2)2 − 7 + 2],
which we need to show is  0, for all  ≥ 2. Clearly, it is so, for all  ≥ 3. For  = 2, the factor is
equal to 3(22− 1)2 + 18(2+ 1− 22) − 1222, which can be shown to be  0, whenever
  1
22− 43 . Since
1
22− 43 
1
22 , we have that the factor is for  0, for all  ≥ 2, when   122 .
Hence, L1  0, for all  ≥ 2, when   122 .
We now show that L  0, for all   1, when   122 . Substituting the values for the ’s, ’s
and ’s, we have,
L
 =
(−)2(22−1)(22+1)(22+2−2−2−1)
3(22+2−4−1)(22+4−4−1)(22−4−1), where,
 = 1224−3623−1223+2423+32222+822+422−3622−1222
+8222 − 122 + 18 + 6 − 12 + 3.
Here, clearly, (i) ( − )2  0; (ii) (22 + 1)  0; and (iii) 3  0. Once again, as   12(−1) ,
we have 22 − 2 − 1  0. Thus, one can verify that (iv) 22 + 2 − 2 − 2 − 1 =
22−2 −1+2(2−−)  0; (v) 22+2−4−1 = 22−2 −1+4(1−)  0;
(vi) 22+4−4−1 = 22−2 −1+2(3−2)  0 as  ≥ 2; and (vii) 22−4−1 =
22 − 2 − 1 + 2(1− 2)  0.
Finally, note that the factor,
 = 1224−3623−1223+2423+32222+822+422−3622−1222
+8222 − 122 + 18 + 6 − 12 + 3
= 1242−1232(3+−2)+422[82+2+1−9−3+22]−122+6(3+−2)+3
= [1242 − 122+ 3] + (3 +  − 2)[6− 1232] + 1222(3 +  − 2)
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+422[82 + 2 + 1− 9 − 3 + 22]− 1222(3 +  − 2)
= 3(22−1)2+6(3+−2) £1 + 2 − 22¤ +422[(+−3)2+7(−2)+2(−1)+2],
is  0, as, 1 + 2 − 22  0 (as,   12(−1) ) and  ≥ 2.
Hence, L  0, for all  6= , and for all   1, when, (22 − 1)  0, i.e., when,   122 . ¥
Proof of Corollary 1. Note that, in the initial problem, we have dropped the constraints
that
−1X
=1
(+1 − ) ( −  )  0, for all  = 1   − 1, be satisfied and found the optimal
solution of this modified constrained maximization problem with a larger “feasible set”. We now add
the constraints that
−1X
=1
(+1 − ) ( −  )  0, for all  = 1   − 1 to the above problem.
However, notice that the above optimal solution, namely, the CS  -partition equilibrium, does satisfy
these constraints and hence will be the solution of the desired maximisation problem. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2.  (1  −1; 12 13  1 ; 21 23  2 ; ; 1  −1)
= (1−X
 6=1
1) £(1)3 − (1 − 1)3¤+X
 6=1
1 £()3 − ( − 1)3¤
+(1−X
 6=2
2) £(2 − 1)3 − (2 − 2)3¤+X
 6=2
2 £( − 1)3 − ( − 2)3¤
+(1−X
 6=3
3) £(3 − 2)3 − (3 − 3)3¤+X
 6=3
3 £( − 2)3 − ( − 3)3¤
++ (1−X
 6=
) £( − −1)3 − ( − )3¤+X
 6=
 £( − −1)3 − ( − )3¤
++ (1−X
 6=
) £( − −1)3 − ( − 1)3¤+X
 6=
 £( − −1)3 − ( − 1)3¤.
Note that  = 0, for all  6=  . Thus,

 = 1
£
3()2 − 3( − 1)2¤  + 1 £3()2 − 3( − 1)2¤ 
+2 £3( − 1)2 − 3( − 2)2¤  + 2 £3( − 1)2 − 3( − 2)2¤ 
++ ¡− £( − −1)3 − ( − )3¤¢+ (1−X
 6=
) £3( − −1)2 − 3( − )2¤ 
+
£
( − −1)3 − ( − )3¤+  £3( − −1)2 − 3( − )2¤ 
++  £3( − −1)2 − 3( − 1)2¤  +  £3( − −1)2 − 3( − 1)2¤  .
Using the incentive compatibility condition for  (equation (1) in the paper), we have,

 = −
£
( − −1)3 − ( − )3¤+ £( − −1)3 − ( − )3¤.
For  = 0, for all  6= ,  = +−12 ,  = +−12 and

 = −
∙³−−1
2
´3 − ³−³−−12 ´´3¸+ ∙³+−1−2−12 ´3 − ³+−1−22 ´3¸
= 34 ( − −1) ( −  + −1 − −1)2  0. ¥
Proof of Lemma 3. We consider the first order conditions for minimisation of  with respect to
,  6= , for any (1  −1).
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For all   ∈ {1  } such that  6= , we have,

 = −
£
( − −1)3 − ( − )3¤+ £( − −1)3 − ( − )3¤
= 3 ( − ) ( − −1) ( −  −  + −1).
Thus,  = 0 =⇒  −  −  + −1 = 0, or,  +  =  + −1. This means that if  = 0,
then  6= 0, for all  6= , because,  6=  . Also, if  = 0, then  6= 0. This proves that, for a
fixed (1  −1), there cannot be a minimum of  at a strictly interior point (i.e., 0    1, for
all   ∈ {1  } such that  6= ).
We now check that, for a fixed (1  −1), there is no other minimum of  at boundary points
(i.e., where some of the  ’s are equal to 0 or 1) which is strictly lower than the value of  at  = 0,
for all  6= .
Case 1. Suppose that  = 0, for all ( ) 6= ( ) and 0    1. Then,  = +−12 and
 = 12
∙
(2−2−1)+(2−2−1)
(−−1)+(−−1)
¸
, in which case  = 0 =⇒  +  =  + −1 =⇒  + −1 =
 + −1, which is not possible.
So, if  = 0, for all ( ) 6= ( ), then  6= 0. In fact, by continuity of  ,  must be  0
(since, from Lemma 2, we have   0, for  = 0, for all  6= ). This shows that 0   ≤ 1 and
 = 0, for all ( ) 6= ( ) cannot be a minimum of 
Case 2. Suppose that 0    1, for some  6= ,  ∈ {1 2  },  ≥ 2, where {1 2  } ⊆
{1 2 } and  = 0,  6=   ∈ {1 2  } satisfy the first order conditions for minimisation of
 . Note from above that if 0    1, for some  6= , then  = 0 and  6= 0, for all  6=  
implying that  = 0, for all  6=  .
Since  = −
£
( − −1)3 − ( − )3¤+ £( − −1)3 − ( − )3¤ = 0, if 0    1, it is
easy to check that the value of  (evaluated at the above  ’s) is the same as the value of  evaluated
at  = 0, for all  6= .
Case 3. Suppose now that  = 1, for some  6= ,  ∈ {1 2  } where {1 2  } ⊂
{1 2 } and  = 0,  6= ,  ∈ {1 2  }. We now check if such a configuration is compatible
with a global minimum of  . Without loss of generality, let 11 = 1 and 1 = 0, for all  6= 1 ∈
{1  }. Let us denote by ∆ the following components in  , given by,
∆ = (1−X
 6=1
1)
£
(1 − 1−1)3 − (1 − 1)3
¤
+
X
6=1
1
£
( − 1−1)3 − ( − 1)3
¤
+(1−X
 6=1
1)
£
(1 − 1−1)3 − (1 − 1)3
¤
+
X
 6=1
1
£
( − 1−1)3 − ( − 1)3
¤
.
Note that, in this particular case, ∆ becomes£
(1 − 1−1)3 − (1 − 1)3
¤
+
£
(1 − 1−1)3 − (1 − 1)3
¤
,
which will always be greater than the value of ∆ evaluated at  = 0, for all  6= , given by£
(1 − 1−1)3 − (1 − 1)3
¤
+
£
(1 − 1−1)3 − (1 − 1)3
¤
.
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Case 4. Suppose now that  = 1, for some  6=  and  ∈ {1 2  } and that 0    1, for
some  6= ,  ∈ {+1 +2  }, where {1 2   +1 +2  } ⊂ {1 2 } and  = 0,
for all  6= ,  ∈ {1 2   +1 +2  }. Combining the arguments in Cases 2 and 3 above,
it can be shown that this configuration cannot correspond to a global minimum of  .
Case 5. Finally, suppose for every ,  = 1, for some  6=  and also, for every , if  = 1 then
 = 0, for all  6= . In this case, it is easy to check that the value of  is equal to the value of  when
 = 0, for all  6= . This is because such a configuration is equivalent to assigning a permutation of
{1  } to each element of the partition. ¥
Proof of Lemma 4.  (1  −1; 12 13  1 ; 21 23  2 ; ; 1  −1)
evaluated at  = 0, for all  6= , becomes,£
(1)3 − (1 − 1)3¤+ £(2 − 1)3 − (2 − 2)3¤
++ £( − −1)3 − ( − )3¤
++ £( − −1)3 − ( − 1)3¤
=
31
4 +
(2−1)3
4 +
(3−2)3
4 + + (1−−1)
3
4 .
Let  = [ ]=1−1 denote the Hessian matrix for  , as a function of {}−1=1 , at  = 0, for
all  6= .
 = 3
2
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
2 − (2 − 1) 0 0    0
− (2 − 1) (3 − 1) − (3 − 2) 0    0
0 − (3 − 2) (4 − 2) − (4 − 3) 0   
0 0      0
       
    0   0
    0 0  
0     0  ( − −2)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(−1)×(−1)

Let 1 2 −1 denote the principal minors of .
Clearly, |1| = 2  0. Also, |2| = 2 (3 − 1) − (2 − 1)2  0 and |3| = (4 − 2) |2| −
2 (3 − 2)2  0, because |2|− (3 − 2) |1|  0.
One can check that for  ≥ 3,
|| =  |−1|− −1−1 |−2| = (+1 − −1) |−1|− ( − −1)2 |−2|.
Note that ||  0, if |−1|− ( − −1) |−2|  0.
We now prove by induction that |−1|− ( − −1) |−2|  0, for  ≥ 3.
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We know that |2|− (3 − 2) |1|  0. Suppose that |−1|− ( − −1) |−2|  0, for  ≥ 3.
Then, ||− (+1 − ) |−1| = ( − −1) |−1|− ( − −1)2 |−2|
= ( − −1) [|−1|− ( − −1) |−2|]  0 (by induction).
Therefore, ||  0, for all . Hence,  is positive definite which implies that  , as a function of
{}−1=1 , at  = 0, for all  6= , is strictly convex. ¥
Proof of Theorem 1. We need to prove that, for   122 , the  -partition CS equilibrium is
actually a global maximum among the set of  -simple mediated equilibria.
Lemma 3 shows that a global minimum of  exists at  = 0, for all  6= . Also, by Lemma 4,  ,
as a function of {}−1=1 , is strictly convex, at  = 0, for all  6= , and hence, has a unique global
minimum in {}−1=1 .
In the final problem,  can be viewed as a function that is equal to −13 , with a further
restriction on the domain of the variables given by the incentive compatibility constraint for .
From Corollary 1, the  -partition CS equilibrium, given by  =  + 2( − ) for all  ∈
{1  };  = −1+2 for all  ∈ {1  } and  = 0 for all ,  ∈ {1  },  6= , is a local
maximum of , and hence a local minimum of  , for   122 .
Thus, for   122 , the values of {}−1=1 in the  -partition CS equilibrium, given by,  =

 + 2( −) for all  ∈ {1  } is the unique global minimum of  in {}−1=1 , at  = 0, for
all  6= , and hence, for   122 , the variables  =  +2(−) for all  ∈ {1  } and  = 0
for all ,  ∈ {1  },  6=  actually provide a global minimum of  .
Hence, in the final problem, among the set of  -simple mediated equilibria, the  -partition CS
equilibrium must attain the global maximum of , for   122 . ¥
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